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I. INTRODUCTION
In the first issue of this volume of the Santa Clara Law
Review, Martin D. Carcieri criticizes the ACLU for its
advocacy opposing California's Proposition 209.1 The editors
have kindly permitted me to respond. I will argue herein that
Professor Carcieri's critique is unpersuasive. It relies on a
distortion of the ACLU position, a misunderstanding of
Supreme Court practice and of equal protection law, a
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University; J.D., Harvard Law School,
1978; B.A., University Without Walls, 1972. I should disclose at the outset that
I am not acting on behalf of the ACLU; I alone am responsible for this response
(although I am extremely grateful to my research assistants, Rachel Brasso
Razon and Catharine Langer, and to my Santa Clara Law Review editor, Keith
Valory, for their invaluable assistance). I do, however, have a close connection
to the ACLU, and to its position on Proposition 209. I serve on the board of
directors of the ACLU of Northern California, and on its legal committee. In
this capacity, I reviewed and supported the recommendation that the ACLU
litigate the legitimacy of Proposition 209. When Judge Henderson's decision
holding the initiative unconstitutional was appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals, I co-authored an amicus curie brief in support of his decision on
behalf of the American Jewish Congress and the National Council of Churches.
And, during the initiative campaign, I frequently debated its merits at public
events at the request of the ACLU. Because I approach this task as a partisan,
not a neutral, I recognize it is particularly important that my assertions are
well supported.
1. Martin D. Carcieri, A Progressive Reply to the ACLU on Proposition 209,
39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 141 (1998).
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reliance on fiction as fact, the substitution of anecdote for
evidence, and a collection of unsupported and unsupportable
assertions about American society today.
First, Professor Carcieri argues that the ACLU was
wrong in claiming that Proposition 209 violates the right to
equal protection provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. He asserts that his position
has been vindicated by the United States Supreme Court,
which voted to deny review of the decision by the United
States Court of Appeals rejecting the ACLU's facial challenge
of the initiative.2 In Part II of this response, I will argue that
the Court's denial of review is not a decision on the merits of
the case and in no way vindicates any parties' position. This
is particularly true because the petition sought review of the
rejection of a facial challenge to the initiative's
constitutionality. Once Proposition 209 is applied to
particular programs and practices, the Supreme Court may
yet rule that, as applied, it is unconstitutional.
Second, Professor Carcieri argues that the ACLU critique
of the initiative is defective because it ignores the will of a
majority of California voters' and elevates "group rights" over
"individual rights."4 In Part III of this response I will argue
that Carcieri has distorted the ACLU position to create a
"straw man." The ACLU lawsuit claimed that Proposition
209, by singling out women and minorities and making it
harder for them, as compared to veterans, disabled persons,
and the elderly, to seek affirmative action type programs,
denied them equal protection of the laws. Professor Carcieri
asserts that the ACLU's arguments "offend democracy."5 But
when majorities deprive minorities of rights guaranteed by
the United States Constitution, a constitutional challenge is
not offensive to our constitutional democracy. Nor does the
ACLU argue, as Carcieri claims, that groups have
constitutional rights; rather, individuals have constitutional
rights when they are denied equal opportunity based on their
group membership. At the heart of the ACLU lawsuit was
the contention that individual women and/or minority group
members were being deprived of their constitutional rights.
2. Id. at 142-43, 147, 181.
3. Id. at 145-47, 181.
4. Id. at 147-62.
5. Id. at 145 n.23.
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Third, Professor Carcieri argues that the ACLU critique
of the initiative is "puzzling"6 because the initiative does not
disproportionately disadvantage women and minority group
members' and is thus not subject to an equal protection
challenge.' In Part IV of this response I will demonstrate
why, under well established constitutional doctrine, the
initiative had precisely the kind of effect on minority group
members that has caused the Supreme Court to reject similar
initiatives in the past.9
Fourth, Professor Carcieri turns to personal anecdote, a
method of argument he had earlier criticized," to argue that
he has personally helped many women and minority group
members by writing letters of reference for them, despite the
fact that he is a white man." He offers this anecdote as proof
that white men are not necessarily racists and do not
necessarily grant preferences to other white men. The
supporters of affirmative action, he argues, actually
encourage white men to discriminate against women and
minorities, not because white men are racists or sexists, but
because white men are given no choice but to defend their
racial and gender self-interests. He then complains that it is
unfair that he is not given fair consideration for public
university teaching positions, relying, as his evidence of such
discrimination, on a work of fiction.' In Part V of this
response I argue that Professor Carcieri's anecdotes and
fictional accounts prove nothing. Despite his unsupported
claims, the available evidence, which he completely
disregards, conclusively demonstrates that white men are not
disadvantaged in the search for university teaching jobs, or in
6. Id. at 164.
7. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 164-67.
8. Id. at 167-72.
9. Id. at 172. Remarkably, Professor Carcieri concedes the possibility that
the ACLU's arguments on this critical point were meritorious and that Judge
Thelton Henderson's district court decision was correct. But he complains that
if so, they were only correct because of their reliance on a sixteen-year-old
decision by the Supreme Court, which, although never overruled, might be
decided differently today.
10. Id. at 160 n.76. "Unlike a legal argument in an adversary proceeding, a
narrative is not subject to challenge or cross-examination, as is essential when
enforceable rights are at stake. A narrator can by ignorance or design omit
parts of a story that would be relevant or even crucial in a legal setting." Id.
11. Id. at 179-81.
12. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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other areas of American society. In most fields of
employment, they continue to enjoy substantial advantages.
In a few areas, affirmative action has leveled the field on
which men and women, white and non-white, compete for
employment opportunities. Carcieri's unsupported insistence
that he, as a white man, is disadvantaged, suggests that he
has substituted anecdote for evidence as a result of personal
bitterness. His own experience has, perhaps, clouded his
judgment and his scholarship.
Finally, Professor Carcieri concludes that some forms of
affirmative action programs, including consideration of race
in college admissions, 3 remedial affirmative action,14 and
aggressive race and gender directed outreach and recruitment
programs," should be permitted to continue. In Part VI of
this response I will discuss the irony of Professor Carcieri's
conclusion. The very programs he would save are those most
at risk under the initiative. The kinds of programs he
condemns were, even before Proposition 209 passed, nearly
impossible to find, because they are so rarely permissible
under the already well established United States Supreme
Court standards Carcieri extols in his article. 6
In Part VII of this response, I conclude that Professor
Carcieri's critique of the ACLU's position on Proposition 209
was ill considered, that his arguments were not well
supported, and that his conclusions should be rejected.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DENIAL OF CERTIORARI IN THE
PROPOSITION 209 CASE WAS NOT A DECISION ON THE MERITS
On November 5, 1996, the California electorate passed
into law Proposition 209, amending the State Constitution to
provide that the state may not "grant preferential treatment
to any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting."7 The
purpose of the initiative was to eliminate governmental
affirmative action.
18
13. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 159, 171.
14. Id. at 173-75.
15. Id. at 181-83.
16. Id. at 172-77.
17. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
18. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1493 (N.D.
1156 [Vol. 39
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The day after the election, the ACLU19 and several other
civil rights organizations,2" as counsel, filed a federal lawsuit
on behalf of thirteen civil rights and business groups 1 and
eleven individuals, challenging the constitutionality of the
initiative. They argued that on its face the new law violated
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, by depriving women and
minority group members of an equal right to participate in
the political life of California communities."
On December 23, 1996, United States District Court
Chief Judge Thelton E. Henderson issued a preliminary
injunction enjoining the state from implementing the
initiative. 3  The court held that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that the
proposition violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The State
appealed. On April 8, 1997, a three judge panel of the United
States Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision by
Circuit Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, vacated the
preliminary injunction, rejecting the ACLU challenge.24 The
Ninth Circuit subsequently denied a petition for rehearing
and denied a petition for rehearing en banc. 5 Thereafter, the
United States Supreme Court denied a stay, and then denied
Cal. 1996).
19. Three ACLU affiliates (Northern California, Southern California, and
San Diego) and the ACLU national legal office were listed among the plaintiffs'
counsel. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (N.D.
Cal. 1996), vacated, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397
(1997). Professor Carcieri refers to this as the ACLU suit, as shall I, but we
both recognize that there were numerous counsel and plaintiffs. See Carcieri,
supra note 1, at 142 n.5.
20. Other counsel included the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and
Equal Rights Advocates (both of whose boards of directors I serve on), as well as
the Employment Law Center, the Impact Fund, the Asian Pacific American
Legal Center, the California Women's Law Center, the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund, and People for the American way. Id.
21. The plaintiffs included the Coalition for Economic Equity (a group of
women and minority small business owners), the California NAACP, the
California AFL-CIO, and several other civil rights and women's and minority
business organizations. Id.
22. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1499-1510 (N.D.
Cal. 1996), vacated, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397
(1997).
23. Id.
24. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
25. Id.
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a petition for a writ of certiorari, thus denying review of the
decision below.26 On remand to the district court, Judge
Henderson entered judgment on the pleadings on behalf of
the defendants, thus rejecting the claim that on its face the
initiative was unconstitutional.27
Professor Carcieri begins his critique of the ACLU's
position in the Proposition 209 controversy by claiming that
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari was a vindication of
his position, and conversely, a repudiation of the ACLU's and
Judge Henderson's. He characterizes the Supreme Court's
denial of the petition as a "refusal to intervene"8 and
describes this refusal as having "given states and localities a
green light." 9 He further interprets the Supreme Court's
decision as "the Court's refusal to disturb the Ninth Circuit's
ruling." 9  Finally, he notes that the Court has rejected
certiorari in other affirmative action cases, as further
evidence of the Court's views.3' By these arguments,
Professor Carcieri suggests that the Court's denial of
certiorari may be taken as evidence of the Court's views of the
merits of the case.
Professor Carcieri commits a serious error in his legal
analysis of the Court's denial of certiorari. First, it is well
established that a denial of certiorari is not a decision on the
merits"2 and that "one cannot deduce any decision on the
merits or other precedential value from such denials.""3 As
Justice Stevens has explained, "[s]ometimes such an order
reflects nothing more than a conclusion that a particular case
may not constitute an appropriate forum in which to decide a
significant issue."34 The Court may be waiting to see what
happens in the State courts, or in other United States Circuit
Courts, or may be waiting for a case that it believes is
26. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997) (denying stay
and denying certiorari).
27. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 1998 WL 61215 (N.D. Cal.).
28. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 142.
29. Id. at 142-43.
30. Id. at 143; see also id. at 171 ("[1The Supreme Court properly declined
to use the political structure doctrine to reverse the Ninth Circuit.").
31. Id. at 142 n.10.
32. See, e.g., Equality Found. Inc., v. City of Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct. 365,
(1998).
33. RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.5 (2d ed. 1992).
34. Equality Found. Inc., v. City of Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct. 365, 365 (1998).
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narrower, or better briefed.
Moreover, in the Proposition 209 case, there was a
particularly compelling reason for the Court to deny
certiorari. The ACLU challenge to the constitutionality of
Proposition 209 was a "facial challenge"-a claim that on its
face the initiative violated the United States Constitution.35
Such cases are particularly good candidates for the denial of
review for two reasons. First, they are the most difficult
challenges to mount. Second, they are likely to return to the
Court with better developed facts, since a ruling denying a
facial challenge to a law's constitutionality does not
determine its constitutionality as applied to a particular set
of facts.
Although there is some disagreement over the proper test
for facial invalidity, the Court has uniformly held that facial
challenges are "generally disfavored." 6  Chief Justice
Rehnquist believes that "a facial challenge to a legislative
[aict is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the [aict would be valid.,
37
Justice Stevens prefers a less stringent rule.38  He would
permit such a challenge when the statute may be invalid "in
all or most cases in which it might be applied."39 Justice
O'Connor describes facial challenges as, "'manifestly, strong
medicine' that 'has been employed by the Court sparingly and
only as a last resort."'4° By any standard, the effect of the
denial of certiorari in the Proposition 209 case was merely to
put off for another day, in a better developed factual setting,
the legitimacy of the initiative as applied to a particular
affirmative action program or practice. Only when the courts,
and perhaps ultimately the Supreme Court, have judged its
constitutional validity as applied, can we determine whether
the initiative violates the Constitution.
35. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (N.D.
Cal. 1997) (granting preliminary injunction), 1998 WL 61215 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
1998) (entering judgment on the pleadings).
36. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990).
37. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
38. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
39. Id. at 739 (emphasis added).
40. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 579 (1998)
(quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
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III. THE ACLU DID NOT "OFFEND DEMOCRACY" BY ARGUING
THAT PROPOSITION 209 WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DID
NOT ARGUE THAT "GROUP RIGHTS" SHOULD BE ELEVATED
OVER "INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS"
The passage of Proposition 209 raised a problem that the
federal courts have confronted many times since the passage
of the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution.
Simply stated, when a white majority4' uses the law, through
legislation, state constitutional amendment, or
referendum/initiative, to repress the rights of minorities, may
the courts properly intervene to reverse the will of the voters?
Because our courts must respect democratic values, including
the value of majority rule, courts must be reluctant to
overturn a properly enacted law. But the principle of judicial
review established in Marbury v. Madison" and the essential
right of minority group members to equal protection of the
law clearly establish that in enforcing the Constitution a
court must sometimes determine that a legislative act or a
voters' initiative is illegitimate. It is this principle that
establishes our nation's status as a "constitutional
democracy" or "constitutional republic."
Professor Carcieri asserts that the ACLU made
"unqualified claims about the dangers of majority rule"' in
arguing that without the safeguards of the Constitution, "the
American system would allow a majority to vote to permit
slavery."" Further, he stated that these arguments "offended
democracy. "4 While recognizing that the Constitution does
41. Proposition 209 passed with the support of 63% of white voters, 39% of
Asian voters, 26% of black voters, and 24% of Latino voters. See Coalition for
Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1495 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
42. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
43. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 146-47.
44. Id. at 144. It is, of course, undeniably true that absent the Thirteenth
Amendment, a majority could reinstate slavery. Professor Carcieri objects to
the ACLU assertion of this fact as a "distort[ion ofl the scope of what is likely or
even possible within our system" because of the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment. Id. at 146 n.29. But this, of course, misses the point. The
Constitution, as amended, prevents the majority from doing that which would
otherwise be permissible.
45. Id. at 144 n.23.
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act as a brake on majority rule," Professor Carcieri argues
that Proposition 209 is entitled to a "presumption" of
constitutionality because it was passed by a majority of
California voters.4 '
Perhaps the best response to this critique is to quote from
Judge Henderson's opinion. One cannot help but conclude
that Judge Henderson anticipated arguments such as
Professor Carcieri's, when he wrote:
It is not for this or any other court to lightly upset the
expectations of the voters. At the same time, our system
of democracy teaches that the will of the people, important
as it is, does not reign absolute but must be kept in
harmony with our Constitution.
Thus, the issue is not whether one judge can thwart the
will of the people; rather, the issue is whether the
challenged enactment complies with our Constitution and
Bill of Rights. Without a doubt, federal courts have no
duty more important than to protect the rights and
liberties of all Americans by considering and ruling on
such issues, no matter how contentious or controversial
they may be. This duty is certainly undiminished where
the law under consideration comes directly from the ballot
box and without the benefit of the legislative process. As
the Supreme Court aptly noted in another socially charged
case: "Nor does the implementation of... change through
popular referendum immunize it [from constitutional
scrutiny]. The sovereignty of the people is itself subject to
those constitutional limitations which have been duly
adopted and remain unrepealed."4
Professor Carcieri further complains that the ACLU's
arguments elevate "group rights" over individual rights."
Professor Carcieri both misstates the ACLU position and
ignores basic principles of Constitutional law. First, the
Supreme Court recognizes that individuals are often
mistreated because of their group identity; when the
46. Id. at 144-45.
47. Id. at 147-48. The problem with this presumption is that virtually all
affirmative action programs were also passed by a majority, albeit a majority of
legislators or other elected officials, and are thus entitled to the same
presumption.
48. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1490 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969)).
49. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 147-62.
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government places higher burdens on racial groups, as
groups, it violates the constitutional rights of the groups'
individual members to equal protection. As the Court
explained in Hunter v. Erickson," a referendum violates equal
protection when it "places unusual burdens on the ability of
racial groups to enact legislation specially designed to
overcome the 'special condition' of prejudice."'
Moreover, the plaintiffs in the ACLU lawsuit, while
acting as class representatives, were themselves individuals
(or in some cases organizations made up of individuals) whose
individual right to equal protection were at stake. They were
individual women and minority group members who, because
of their group status, would lose government benefits to
which they were entitled. Veterans were not threatened with
the loss of veterans' benefits. Elderly persons were not
threatened with the loss of programs for the elderly. But
women and minority group members were threatened with
the loss of affirmative action programs that were available to
them because they were members of one or more groups
which were entitled to such benefits. Without being
permitted to analyze discrimination cases as class-based
"group" discrimination cases, the Fourteenth Amendment,
and most civil rights statutes, would be eviscerated.
IV. THE ACLU PRESENTED A LEGITIMATE, ALTHOUGH
UNSUCCESSFUL, ARGUMENT THAT PROPOSITION 209 VIOLATES
THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT DISTORTS GOVERNMENTAL
PROCESSES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PLACE SPECIAL BURDENS ON
THE ABILITY OF MINORITY GROUPS TO ACHIEVE BENEFICIAL
LEGISLATION
Turning to the substance of the ACLU's argument,
Professor Carcieri complains that the ACLU and Judge
Henderson improperly applied a doctrine of the constitutional
law of equal protection known as the "Hunter/ Seattle
doctrine."52 He claims to be "puzzled""3 at how the ACLU
50. 393 U.S. 386 (1969).
51. Id. at 486 (quoting United States v. Caroline Products, 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4 (1938)).
52. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) and Washington v. Seattle
Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see also Vikram D. Amar and Evan H.
Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and the CCRI, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019 (1996).
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could have made such an argument, and how Judge
Henderson could have accepted it. Moreover, he asserts, even
if the doctrine was properly argued and applied, it requires
reliance on an "old" and close decision, and should be
discarded.54  I will argue herein that any "puzzlement"
Professor Carcieri claims is disingenuous. The doctrine has
clear application to the Proposition 209 case. Moreover, there
is no authority for the proposition that judges and lawyers
should ignore close cases or "old" cases, particularly where
"old" means a 1982 decision.55
A. The Hunter/Seattle Doctrine
In the wake of the Civil War, this nation amended our
Constitution to provide that no state may deprive "any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" 6 and
that the "right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
state on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."57 Since early in this century, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that states may deprive
Americans of their civil rights by indirection as well as
explicit classification, by creating classifications that, in their
effect, exclude participation in democratic decision making. 8
States may accomplish this by legislative acts, amending
their constitutions,59 or by popular referendum. °
In Hunter v. Erickson6 and Washington v. Seattle School
District6e 2 the Court held that a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment is established when an initiative, although
53. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 164.
54. Id. at 172.
55. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
56. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
57. U.S. CONST. amend XV.
58. See, e.g., Guinn and Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)
(Oklahoma Constitutional provision excluding from literacy voting test all
persons entitled to vote on or before January 1, 1866, and all persons then living
outside the United States, as well as their descendants, violated 15th
Amendment rights of black Americans).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (initiative by
California voters voiding State's housing discrimination law violated
Fourteenth Amendment).
61. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
62. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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neutral on its face, "mak[es] it more difficult for certain
racial ... minorities to achieve legislation that is in their
interest."" While a state's voters may decide to make it more
difficult to enact or amend laws on a certain subject matter,
they may not make it selectively more difficult for minorities
alone.64 Thus, a law that "subtly distorts governmental
processes in such a way as to place special burdens on the
ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation"5 or
selectively burdens programs developed "primarily to the
benefit of the minority"6 6 violates equal protection.
In Hunter, the voters of Akron, Ohio, amended their city
charter to repeal a fair housing law passed by the city council
and to require approval by the voters before any future
housing discrimination ordinance could take effect. Although
the referendum did not create an explicit racial classification,
the Court held that it discriminated against minorities by
making it harder to regulate discrimination in real estate
transactions than to regulate other aspects of real estate
practice.67  In Seattle, the voters of Washington passed
Initiative 350, a referendum prohibiting local school boards
from using busing to remedy de facto segregation, while
permitting boards to use busing for other purposes. The
Court explained that the practical effect was to reallocate
democratic decision-making power on a racial basis.
The initiative removes the authority to address a racial
problem-and only a racial problem-from the existing
decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority
interests. Those favoring the elimination of de facto school
segregation now must seek relief from the state
legislature, or from the statewide electorate. Yet
authority over all other student assignment decisions, as
well as over most other areas of educational policy,
remains vested in the local school board. . . . [As] in
Hunter, then, the community's political mechanisms are
modified to place effective decisionmaking authority over a
681racial issue at a different level of government.
63. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969).
64. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
65. Id. at 467.
66. Id. at 472.
67. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387-90.
68. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474.
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B. Carcieri Critique of the ACLU Position
Professor Carcieri asserts that the ACLU's argument,
and Judge Henderson's finding, that the Hunter/Seattle
doctrine was relevant to the Proposition 209 case is
"puzzling."69 First, he complains, Proposition 209 prohibited
affirmative action programs for all racial and gender groups,
not just women and minorities; therefore, it had no special
impact on minorities or women.7 ° Second, he argues, even if
the initiative was directed at minorities and women, it was
only directed at denying them preferences, not protecting
them from discrimination; because it "functions to place
individuals on an equal footing" it cannot violate the right to
equal protection.7  Finally, he concludes, even if the
Hunter/Seattle doctrine does properly apply to Proposition
209, "it is a sixteen-year-old, five-to-four decision by a much
more liberal Court than the Court sitting today," and, as
such, should not have been relied upon by the ACLU or Judge
Henderson."2
C. Response to Carcieri's critique
The ACLU, Judge Henderson, Judge O'Scannlain,
Professor Carcieri, and Professors Amar and Caminker, have
exhaustively discussed the application of the Hunter/Seattle
doctrine to the Proposition 209 case; I will not attempt to add
anything to that discussion.73 But however this question is
ultimately resolved, the reader should not be "puzzled," as
Professor Carcieri was, that the ACLU and Judge Henderson
found the Hunter/Seattle doctrine applicable.
First, despite its neutral language, the initiative had a
completely different impact on women and minorities than on
white men, because the affirmative action programs banned
by Proposition 209 were exclusively programs intended to
benefit women and minorities. In this regard, Proposition
209 was just like the Akron amendment struck down in
69. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 164.
70. Id. at 164-65.
71. Id. at 168-69.
72. Id. at 172.
73. See Amar and Caminker, supra note 52 (arguing that under the
Hunter/Seattle doctrine, Proposition 209 is unconstitutional). As Professor
Carcieri explains, this article was substantially relied upon by the ACLU briefs
and by Judge Henderson.
116519991
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Hunter. As the ACLU explained in its petition for writ of
certiorari, the Court in Hunter
readily discounted the facial neutrality of the charter
amendment, which "dr[ew] no distinctions among racial
and religious groups," finding that it would nonetheless
uniquely disadvantage those benefiting from race-
conscious fair housing laws-i.e., minorities-by forcing
them to run a legislative "gauntlet" of popular approval
that other laws and thus other groups were spared. As
the [Hunter] Court concluded, "[t]he reality is that the
law's impact falls on the minority."74
This is equally true of Proposition 209. The California
Ballot Pamphlet prepared by the California Legislative
Analyst's Office provided that a "YES" vote on the initiative
meant "[t]he elimination of those affirmative action programs
for women and minorities . . . ." As Judge Henderson found,
and no party disputed, despite its neutral language the only
programs affected by the initiative were race-conscious and
gender-conscious affirmative action programs for women and
minorities."6 Professor Carcieri may conclude that there
should be an affirmative action exception to the
Hunter/Seattle doctrine or that the doctrine should be
overruled, but to feign "puzzlement" at how Proposition 209
affects women and minorities within the meaning of Hunter
and Seattle is disingenuous at best.
Professor Carcieri's second argument, that the ACLU
should not have challenged Proposition 209 because a ban on
affirmative action places all people on an "equal footing" and
thus cannot violate equal protection, is similarly myopic. The
decisions in Hunter and Seattle speak to this very point. The
Akron charter amendment put all people on an "equal
footing" by permitting race discrimination against whites and
blacks equally. But, as the Court recognized, in a community
in which the social problem addressed by the anti-
discrimination ordinance was discrimination against blacks,
the effect of its repeal was not felt equally-it rested entirely
on the black residents of Akron who had lost their legal
74. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, No._ (1997) Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 17 (citations omitted) (on file with author)
75. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1493 (N.D.
Cal. 1996).
76. Id. at 1489, 1495-97.
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protection against discrimination.77 The Washington law put
all people on an "equal footing" by prohibiting all busing to
eliminate segregation, but its impact was felt only by the
minority residents of Seattle who had sought a busing remedy
to improve their children's education."8 In the same way,
although Proposition 209 prohibits affirmative action for
whites as well as minorities, and men as well as women, it
does not put them on a true "equal footing" because such
programs have only been needed by women and minorities.
The point of the Seattle and Hunter decisions was to
scrutinize laws that, although putting all people on an "equal
footing," were discriminatory in their application.
Finally, Professor Carcieri's argument that the ACLU
and Judge Henderson should not have relied on the
Hunter/Seattle doctrine, even if it is applicable, because
Seattle was decided sixteen years ago on a five-to-four vote by
a more liberal Court, is ridiculous. Professor Carcieri cites no
authority for the novel proposition that Supreme Court
decisions in close cases, or "old" cases (if sixteen years is
"old"), should not be treated as stare decisis. Such a doctrine
would cripple the Court's authority, and reduce all legal
questions to political guesswork. As scholarship or advocacy,
it deserves to be thoroughly rejected.
V. DESPITE THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THE EXISTENCE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN AND
MINORITIES IS FAR MORE PREVALENT THAN DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WHITE MEN
A. Professor Carcieri's Position
Professor Carcieri's purpose in attacking the ACLU's
position becomes clear as he moves from law to social science.
He argues that because of affirmative action, white men are
disfavored in seeking employment in the United States
today." He points in particular to the purported difficulty of
finding academic teaching positions in higher education,
apparently relying on his own experiences. For example, he
77. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969).
78. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
79. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 149, 156-57, 177. ("[Tlhe current trend in the
private sector is to disfavor the hiring of white males."). Id. at 177 n.151.
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asserts that the norm in hiring professors is
the "two pile" method. Under this practice, applications
for university teaching positions are sorted at the outset of
the selection process into a "favored pile" for women and
people of color, and a "disfavored pile" to be denied serious
consideration, for white males. It is so widely known to be
used among public and private institutions that it is
openly discussed in the law journals. 80
As authority for this very serious accusation, Professor
Carcieri's only citations are to a work of fiction. He relies
entirely on two related articles appearing in the Texas Law
Review. The first, Michael Paulson's Reverse Discrimination
and Law School Faculty Hiring: the Undiscovered Opinion,8
is an obviously fictional judicial opinion, written by Professor
Paulson but described by him, tongue in cheek, as his
"discovery" rather than his own work.82 Professor Paulson
pretends that a law school used the "two pile" hiring method,
in order to discuss whether it would be permissible. When
asked, Professor Paulson readily admitted that the work was
fiction, that he assumed a reader would understand it was
fiction, and that he could not document a single case of the
"two pile" method being used in faculty hiring.83 Professor
Carcieri's second, and final, citation to support his assertions
about the two pile method is to an article responding to
Professor Paulson's.84 This second article assumes the truth
of the findings in Paulson's fictional opinion in order to
critique its legal analysis.
For a scholar to substitute fiction for fact in this manner
is highly disturbing. For such a serious mistake to avoid
detection in a highly regarded law journal compounds the
problem. If Professor Carcieri's article is widely circulated, it
may itself become the "authority" for claims by others that
law schools commonly hire by this "two pile" method. To have
made this assertion based on such evidence is an egregious
and inflammatory error.
Armed with this straw man "evidence" that law schools
80. Id. at 149 n.35.
81. 71 TEx. L. REV. 993 (1993).
82. Id. at 994.
83. Telephone Interview with Michael Paulson (Mar. 3, 1999).
84. See Richard Delgado, Five Months Later (The Trial Court Opinion), 71
TEX. L. REV. 1011 (1993).
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are unfairly disfavoring employment applications by white
men, Professor Carcieri argues that the "two pile" method
should be abandoned as unnecessary, since white men should
not be assumed to disfavor women and minorities.85 Earlier
in his article, Carcieri complained about the work of another
scholar who used personal narrative in an article she wrote
on discrimination. Writing about Professor Yxta Maya
Murray's use of narrative in her article, Merit Teaching,"
Professor Carcieri argued "unlike a legal argument in an
adversary proceeding, a narrative is not subject to challenge
or cross-examination, as is essential when enforceable
individual rights are at stake."87 But now, he offers his own
good deeds, in the form of writing letters of reference for
women and minority students applying to law school,88 as
evidence that white men should not be presumed to
discriminate. While making it clear that he personally
intends to continue writing reference letters, he concludes
that if he were solely concerned with racial and gender self-
interest, he should stop helping his female or non-white
students.8  Finally, he dismisses the possibility of sex
discrimination occurring in American life, by pointing out
that women "are a majority, not a minority, and 'the majority
needs no protection from discrimination.' 9  The empirical
data discussed in the next section demonstrate that women
have a very substantial need for protection, as do minority
group members, from race and gender discrimination.
B. Empirical Data Demonstrate that White Men Are Not
Disadvantaged in Seeking Academic Positions in Higher
Education.
Empirical data abound examining the employment
practices of American colleges and universities. Regrettably,
Professor Carcieri fails to consider any of these data in
85. He writes, "the idea that white males always stick together, and that
the playing field is thus always tilted in their favor, is a sham." Carcieri, supra
note 1, at 176-77 n.150.
86. 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1073 (1996).
87. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 160 n.76.
88. Id. at 178-79.
89. Id. at 180.
90. Id. at 170 n.125 (quoting Judge O'Scannlain's opinion for the Ninth
Circuit in Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 119 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir.
1997).
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making his argument that white men are disfavored in
academic hiring. Had he done so, he would have been forced
to confront the reality that the facts lend no support to his
position. Rather, the statistics that follow will demonstrate
that white men are not disfavored in seeking academic
positions in higher education. These statistics reveal the fact
that white men are disproportionately represented among
American college, university, and law school faculty,
including new faculty; that men in academia are paid
substantially more than women; that white men find faculty
positions at rates similar to women and minorities; and that
at the highest levels of academia-full professors, tenured
law professors, and law deans-white men overwhelmingly
dominate. They further reveal that in most areas of
American life, women and minorities are severely
disadvantaged, and that white men enjoy far greater
employment opportunities and much higher pay than do
comparably qualified women and minority group members.
At last count (Fall 1993) there were 545,706 full-time
instructional faculty in American institutions of higher
education.9 Of this total 313,278, or 57.4%, were white men.92
An additional 155,492, or 28.5%, were white women.93 Thus
85.9% of the full-time faculty in our colleges and universities
in the Fall of 1993 were white; a mere 76,936, or 14.1%, were
racial or ethnic minority group members.
By comparison, the 1993 civilian labor force of
128,040,000 employees was 77% white.94 African Americans
made up 11% of the workforce, Hispanic Americans 8%, and
Asian Americans another 4%. 5  Men composed 54% of the
workforce;96 white men, 44%.97 In other words, our college
91. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 239, tbl. 226 (1997) ("Full-time
instructional faculty in institutions of higher education, by race/ethnicity,
academic rank, and sex: Fall 1993").
92. Id. I use the term "white" to include only non-Hispanic whites. The
census term is "white, non-Hispanic."
93. Id.
94. HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS tbl. 1 (1997) ("Civilian labor force
by sex, age, race, and Hispanic origin, 1982, 1993, and 1994, and moderate
growth projection to 2025").
95. Id. The data report no American Indian workers, suggesting that the
white figure is slightly overstated.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 11, 16 (("Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional
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faculties are significantly more white, and substantially more
white and male, than the overall American work force.
Although these data alone are provocative, they still do
not tell the full story. In 1993, whites constituted 90.2% of all
full professors at American colleges and universities.98 Less
than 1% of the full professors were African American women,
while 15% were white women, and 75.2% were white men."
One might argue that since most of the full professors
counted in 1993 had been hired years earlier, the dominance
of white men may tell us more about the history of excluding
women and minorities than it does the current practice. It is
then, particularly revealing that even at the assistant
professor level, where most persons counted were in their
first few years of college teaching, 81.4% were whites, 57.9%
were men, and 46.2% were white men."' In other words, the
most recent data available concerning employment of newly
hired college professors shows that white men are hired at a
higher rate than their overall workforce participation. By
contrast, African Americans, who made up 11% of the civilian
workforce, made up only 6% of the assistant professors in
1993.101 Hispanic Americans, who made up 8% of the civilian
workforce, constituted only 2.6% of the assistant professors. 1°
Not only are college professors far more likely to be men
than women, the men whom Professor Carcieri describes as
disfavored are likely to earn more than their female
counterparts. Full-time male faculty in 1995-96 earned an
average of 23.2% more than full-time women faculty.' Even
among the most recently hired full-time faculty, assistant
professors employed in 1995-96, men earned 6.6% more than
women.' Similar data for minorities is not available.
As of the 1995-96 academic year, 82.1% of the doctoral
degrees held by the American civilian population were held
Population, 1947-1995") (white male civilian labor force)).





103. Id. at 250-51, tbl. 234 ("Average salary of full-time instructional faculty
on nine-month contracts in institutions of higher education, by academic rank,
sex, and control type of institution: 1970-71 to 1995-96").
104. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, supra note 91, at 250-51, tbl. 234.
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by whites,"5 who held an even greater percentage, 85.9%, of
the full-time college and university teaching positions.' In
1995, white men, who composed 46.2% of the newly hired full-
time faculty, the assistant professors,' ° earned 46.1% of the
doctoral degrees awarded by American universities to
American citizens and resident aliens.' Thus, as of 1995-96,
white men were being hired for assistant professor jobs at
just slightly above their proportion of newly awarded Ph.D.s.
These data are inconsistent with Professor Carcieri's
assertion that white men are disfavored in seeking such
positions. Rather, the data suggest that in academic hiring,
race and sex preferences have been largely eliminated.
Further support for the proposition that white men have
similar academic employment opportunities as women and
minority group members is found in a 1996 report issued by
the Association of American Colleges and Universities.' ° The
report describes a study of 393 recipients of Ford, Mellon, and
Spencer fellowships who completed their Ph.D.s after 1989.
Students receiving such fellowships are the cream of the
academic crop; their experiences tell us much about who
succeeds in the academic job market of the 1990s. The study
sample included significant numbers of whites, blacks,
Hispanics, Asian or Pacific Islanders, and American Indians;
approximately half were women."' Participants were asked
to rate their post-graduate academic job market experiences.
Among those who placed themselves in the top categories of
success, in that they reported being sought after, or having a
good experience after applying for jobs, were 24% of the white
men, 25% of the white women, 26% of the minority women,
and 27% of the minority men."' In plain terms, the white
men had nearly identical success as the other groups.' Among
those who reported fewer choices, but who found at least one
105. Id. at 18, tbl. 9 ("Highest level of education attained by persons age 18
and over, by age, sex, and race/ethnicity: March 1996").
106. Id. at 239, tbl. 226.
107. See supra at note 100 and accompanying text.
108. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, supra note 91, 301, tbl. 271
("Doctor's degrees conferred by institutions of higher education, by racial/ethnic
group and sex of student: 1976-77 to 1994-95").
109. See DARYL G. SMITH, ACHIEVING FACULTY DIVERSITY: DEBUNKING THE
MYTHS, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1996).
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id. at 65, tbl. 14.
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faculty position, were 37% of the minority men, 37% of the
minority women, 51% of the white women, and 51% of the
white men. 12 Thus, 76% of the white men received faculty
positions, compared with 77% of the white women, 64% of the
minority men, and 63% of the minority women.
In 1997-98, 86.8% of American law school faculty
members were white, 69.8% were men, and 61.9% were white
men.13 The new faculty first listed in 1997-98 were 83%
white, 53.2% men, and 42% white men. The candidates
known to be actively seeking law school faculty positions in
1997-98 were 21.6% minority, 78.4% white,115 suggesting that
white applicants were disproportionately more likely to be
hired than minority applicants. The number of new law
professors hired each year is quite small. In 1997-98, only
100 new assistant and associate professors were hired, of
whom ten were black, one was Hispanic, four were Asian, and
83 were white, including 45 white men."1 6 These positions are
highly competitive; no group has had great success. From
1992-97, fewer than 10% of all known candidates for law
faculty positions were successful in joining any faculty."7 In
some years, women had greater success than men; in other
years, men had greater success than women."' In each of
these years, among the known candidates minority group
members had a measurable advantage over white candidates,
but it was small enough that in only one of the five years was
it statistically significant."9  Among those faculty hired
between 1992 and 1997 whose race or ethnicity was reported,
the overall success rate for all known candidates was 11%,
while the success rate for white candidates was 10%,12° and
112. Id.
113. Association of American Law Schools Statistical Report on Law School
Faculty and Candidates for Law Faculty Positions, 1997-98, tbl. 1A (visited
April 9, 1999) <http://www.aals.org/statistics/rpt9798w.html>.
114. Id. at tbl. 3A.
115. Id. at tbl. 5B.
116. Id. at tbls. 8D and 8E.
117. Id. at tbl. 7A.
118. Id. at tbl. 7B (compare 1996-97, when 8.2% of the women and 7.7% of
the men were successful, with 1995-96, when 9.4% of the women and 11.2% of
the men were successful).
119. Association of American Law Schools Statistical Report on Law School
Faculty and Candidates for Law Faculty Positions, 1997-98, 4 (visited April 8,
1999) (commentary on tbl. 7) <http://www.aals.org/statistics/rpt9798w.html>.
120. Id. at tbl. 7D.
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the overall success for white males was 8.8%.121 In raw
numbers, during the years 1992 through 1997, there were
1,803 new law faculty hired at American law schools whose
ethnicity was reported."' Despite the system described by
Professor Carcieri, in which applications by white men are
discarded, 682 of the faculty hired (37.8%) were white men.'
Among law school tenure track hires between 1992 and 1998,
41% were white men, 31% were white women, 14% were
minority men, and 13% were minority women.2 4  By
comparison, although the precise numbers have not been
reported, there are sufficient reported data to discern that
fewer than half of all law school graduates in the 1990s have
been white men.'25
Moreover, hiring is no guarantee of tenure. At most
American law schools, promotion to tenure is awarded at the
time of promotion to full professor. In 1997-98, over thirty
years after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 72.9% of
the full professors at American law schools were white men;
only 2.7% were minority women.' 6 And 83.8% of the law
school deans were white men; less than 1% were minority
women. 127
These data suggest that white men once had an
enormous advantage when applying for college and university
teaching positions and may still have such an advantage
when considered for tenure. In initial hiring, however, their
advantage has shrunk to the point where they are sometimes
slightly less likely, and sometimes slightly more likely, to
receive such positions when compared with equally
credentialed women and minority group members. Rather
than telling a story of preferences for women and minority
group members, as Professor Carcieri argues, the data
suggest that, at best, the playing field has been leveled to the
point that women and minority group members have similar
121. Id. at tbl. 7E.
122. Id. at tbl. 4.
123. Id.
124. Id. at tbl. 8E.
125. See American Bar Association (visited April 8, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/legaled/ at jd.html, minstats.html and femstats.html>.
126. Association of American Law Schools Statistical Report on Law School
Faculty and Candidates for Law Faculty Positions, 1997-98, at tbl. 1A (visited




opportunities as white men for entry-level academic teaching
positions. Of course, to a white man who has become
accustomed to enjoying a racial and gender privilege, this
may well seem like "reverse discrimination." Hence the
importance of relying on empirical data, rather than personal
anecdote. In sum, white men are not being excluded from
academic teaching positions, but they are being required to
compete with women and minorities and are finding that in
initial hiring, they no longer have an advantage based on
their race and sex. This may be disappointing to some white
men, but it is hardly cause to complain.
C. Women and Minorities Continue to Be Substantially
Disfavored in Most Areas of Employment in the United States
Today
The data described in Part V.B. demonstrates that
women and minorities have made substantial progress in
achieving equality of employment opportunity in higher
education. In most areas of American employment, however,
the data suggest far less progress.
As of 1997, a white man whose highest degree was a
bachelor's degree earned, on average, $48,014 per year. A
similarly educated black man earned $35,558, while a
Hispanic man earned $38,130. A similarly educated white
woman earned $28,667, while a black woman earned $29,311
and a Hispanic woman earned $27,407.12'8 Thus, women and
minorities with bachelor's degrees earned just 57-74% of what
similarly educated white men earned. The disparity was
even greater for those with master's degrees. While the white
man averaged $63,113, the black man earned just $40,313
and the Hispanic man just $36,370. Among women with
master's degrees, white women earned an average of $36,687,
compared with $35,903 for black women and $37,660 for
Hispanic women.19  Thus the disparity varied from 57-64%.
In 1997, a white man with an associate's (junior college)
degree actually earned more, on average, than a black woman
with a master's degree.
3
128. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
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In considering these data, one might wonder what
portion represents the continuing effects of past-and once
legal-discrimination. It is thus useful to know that by 1995
nearly 70% of the civilian labor force was under the age of
45131 and had thus entered the labor force after the 1964 Civil
Rights Act took effect.
Even among younger workers, those who entered the
labor force since the mid-1980s, the disparity is substantial.
As of 1998, among year-round full-time workers aged 25-34
holding a bachelor's degree, white men earned an average
(median) of $39,966.1" By comparison, similarly well-educated
Hispanic men earned just $32,853, and similarly educated
black men earned $30,415.13' Among similarly educated
women, whites earned $32,095, Hispanics $30,909, and
blacks $30,628.1" In other words, college educated young
white men receive an average annual bonus of nearly $10,000
over similarly educated young black men and women, and of
at least $7,000 over any other group.
As of 1997, African Americans made up 10.8% of the
civilian labor force, but constituted 6.9% of all executive,
administrative, and managerial employees, 4.8% of all editors
and reporters, 4.2% of all physicians, 3.9% of all engineers,
2.7% of all lawyers, and 2.6% of all dentists. They also
constituted, however, 15.6% of all cashiers, 17.8% of all
cleaners and servants, 21.5% of all telephone operators,
24.2% of all mail clerks, 27.1% of the private household maids
and housemen, and 34.5% of all nursing aides, orderlies, and
attendants. They were 17% of all typists, but only 8.7% of all
secretaries.'1
Hispanic Americans made up 9.8% of the 1997 civilian
labor force, yet constituted 5.4% of all executive,
administrative, and managerial employees, 4.8% of the
131. HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS 31 ("Civilian Labor Force by Sex,
Race, Hispanic Origin, and Age, 1948-1995") (1997).
132. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY 1998, tbl. 8, (visited April 8, 1999) ("Income by
Educational Attainment for Persons 18 Years Old and Over, by Age, Sex, Race,




135. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1998, tbl. 672 (Employed Civilians, by
Occupation, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1983 and 1997).
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physicians, 3.8% of the engineers and lawyers, 1.7% of the
editors and reporters, and 1.1% of the dentists. By contrast,
they also made up 24.8% of the maids and housemen, 31.3%
of the private household cleaners and servants, 33.8% of the
textile sewing machine operators, 41.3% of the farm workers,
and 44.1% of the textile pressing machine operators. They
made up 5.4% of the elementary school teachers, but 17.4% of
the child care workers.
Women made up 46.2% of the 1997 civilian labor force,
but only 30% of the computer programmers, 26.6% of the
lawyers, 26.2% of the physicians, 4.7% of the aerospace
engineers, 3.1% of the firefighters, 1.6% of the carpenters,
1.5% of the auto mechanics, and 1.2% of the pilots and
navigators. By contrast, they made up 93.5% of the
registered nurses, 96.5% of the receptionists, and 98.6% of the
secretaries. Women were 98.2% of the dental hygienists, but
only 17.3% of the dentists. They were 97.8% of the pre-
kindergarten and kindergarten teachers, but only 42.7% of
the college and university teachers.'
Although we have no precise measure of the degree to
which sex and race discrimination have caused these
disparities, we do have some measures of how common such
discrimination is in the 1990s. A series of controlled
experiments, in which equally qualified job applicants were
paired, and their experiences with specific employers
compared, revealed substantial discrimination against well-
qualified women and minority job applicants. The Urban
Institute conducted several of the experiments.18  These
studies paired college-age men with identical simulated job
qualifications and directed them to seek employment,
following a carefully scripted plan, from the same firms. In a
study conducted in the summer of 1990, white and black job
seekers applied for entry level jobs advertised in newspapers
in Washington, D.C. and Chicago. A total of 476 tests,
termed "audits," were conducted. In our nation's capitol,
when a job was available, the white auditors were more than
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED,
OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING (1991); CROSS
ET AL., EMPLOYER HIRING PRACTICES: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF HISPANIC
AND ANGLO JOB SEEKERS (1990).
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three times as likely to receive job offers as the black
auditors. 9 In Chicago, when a job was available, the white
auditors were twice as likely to receive a job offer. 4° In two
similar studies, using white and Hispanic auditors in Chicago
and San Diego, the white applicants were over 50% more
likely to be offered available jobs than were the Hispanic
applicants. 4' Where both applicants were offered a job, in
16.7% of the cases the white applicant was offered a higher
starting salary-a phenomenon never experienced by a black
applicant.'42 Where both applicants were offered a job, the
average starting salary was $5.45 per hour. But where only
the white applicant was offered the job, the starting pay was
$7.13 per hour.4 3
Another series of audits was conducted between 1990 and
1992 by the Fair Employment Council of Greater
Washington, Inc.44  The tests revealed that "blacks were
treated significantly worse than equally qualified whites
24[%] of the time and Latinos were treated worse than whites
22[%] of the time" in employment hiring decisions. 145 A recent
study that combined and re-examined the results of the
Urban Studies experiments determined that when a white job
applicant was interviewed he or she had a 46.9% likelihood of
being offered an available job; for a similarly qualified black
applicant the likelihood of a job offer was 11.3%. 46 In other
words, the white applicant was over four times more likely to
get the job than the equally qualified black applicant. In
light of these data, it is hard to accept Professor Carcieri's
assertion that white men are "simply asking for what
southern blacks during the Civil Rights era sought."1 47
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. CROSS ETAL., supra note 138, at 41, tbl. 5.1.
142. Id. at 32.
143. Id. at 35.
144. See Christopher Edley, Jr. and George Stephanopoulos, Affirmative
Action Review: Report to the President 1995, 21 (visited April 9, 1999)
<http'//www.whitehouse.gov/wh/eop/op/html/aa/aa-index.html>.
145. Id.
146. See Marc Bendick, Jr., et al., Measuring Employment Discrimination
Through Controlled Experiments, REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 25, 31 (1994).
147. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 146 n.29. Similarly, Professor Carcieri does
nothing to bolster his credibility when he complains that the ACLU has the
"goal of vindicating the interests only of certain groups." Id. at 148 n.31.
Assuming, as one must given the context, that he means the interests of women
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Another audit, focusing on discrimination against
Hispanics, was conducted by the United States General
Accounting Office (GAO). It found that Hispanic job auditors
received 25% fewer job interviews and 34% fewer offers than
white auditors. 8 In surveying four million employers to
determine the effect of the employer sanctions for hiring
undocumented workers imposed by the Immigration Reform
Control Act (IRCA), the GAO found that 19% of the employers
surveyed had decided to entirely stop hiring Hispanics in
order to avoid mistakenly hiring illegal aliens.
4 9
A 1995 audit report focusing on sex discrimination found
that in high priced restaurants "men were more than twice as
likely to receive an interview and five times as likely to
receive a job offer than the women testers."'5 ° In a 1987 study
in which women phoned to inquire about jobs as auto
mechanics, electricians, painters, carpenters, and
construction laborers, 22% were falsely told the job had been
filled when it had not, or falsely told it paid less than it
actually did, while another 18% were discouraged from
applying.'5 '
VI. THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS THAT THE ACLU
SOUGHT TO SAVE IN ITS LAWSUIT ARE THE VERY PROGRAMS
PROFESSOR CARCIERI SUPPORTS
Although the central point of Professor Carcieri's article
was his attack on the ACLU challenge to Proposition 209, in
three critical areas he concedes the legitimacy of affirmative
action. First, he concedes that in the case of "race-based
college admissions, ... preferences based on immutable traits
are relatively defensible." 2 He complains, however, that sex-
and minorities, one can only wonder how some of the ACLU's other clients
would react. For example, consider the ACLU's representation of the KKK and
the Nazi party in other recent cases.
148. See Edley and Stephanopoulos, supra note 144.
149. Id.
150. David Neumark et al., Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring; An
Audit Study, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC. (Feb. 1995).
151. See Norma A. Winston, Sex-Bias Response to Telephoned Job Inquiries,
Tampa, 1987, 72 SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 2, 121-24 (1988).
152. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 159 n.74. He makes this concession, he
explains, because "[a]n opportunity is a chance. Undergraduate admission to a
good public university is thus fairly termed an opportunity and, again, there is
some merit to the argument for race based preferences in that context." Id. at
171 n.128.
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based preferences in public college admission cannot be
justified.'53 Second, he agrees that race-based affirmative
action is an appropriate remedy to "identified
discrimination.""' Finally, he expresses his support for
affirmative action in the form of "outreach and aggressive
recruiting programs .... [If] they are used only in the pre-
selection stages of the public college admissions, employment,
and contracting processes . . . . 1" It is the supreme irony of
his article that the forms of affirmative action he in fact
supports are the very heart of what the ACLU is attempting
to save.
A. College Admission Programs
Much of the public discussion on both sides of the
Proposition 209 debate focused on its prohibition of race-
based preferences in public education. The news coverage,
and the measurable impact in the wake of the initiative's
passage, has been largely concentrated on the drop in the
number of minority students admitted to the undergraduate
programs at UC Berkeley and UCLA, as well as their law
schools and medical schools. The admission of non-minority
women has not been affected, since there have been no
affirmative action admissions based on gender for several
years. It is the black, Latino, Filipino, and American Indian
students-students Professor Carcieri concedes might be
entitled to affirmative action preferences"1 6-who have
suffered dramatically because of Proposition 209. Given
Professor Carcieri's concession, he should have applauded the
ACLU's position.
B. Remedial Affirmative Action
Remedial affirmative action, which Professor Carcieri
also supports,'57 is used in employment and contracting when
153. Id. at 159 n.74. He offers no authority for the assertion that public
colleges or universities continue to provide gender-based admissions policies. I
know of none. It is likely that the only impact of Proposition 209's ban on
gender preferences in education will be on math and science programs for
middle school and high school girls.
154. Id. at 173-75.
155. Id. at 181-82.
156. See Carcieri, supra note 1, at 159 n.74. "Concededly, preferences based
on immutable traits are relatively defensible in this context." Id.
157. Id. at 173-74.
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an employer or business has been identified as having
discriminated on the basis of race, sex, or ethnicity. Although
at one time governmental entities could also engage in non-
remedial set asides,' that time is long gone. As Professor
Carcieri recognizes, under the Supreme Court decisions
beginning with Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education"9 and
continuing through City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. ,160 the
Court has prohibited all governmental affirmative action
preference programs in government contracting and
employment that were not remedial. 6' Since 1989, the only
preference programs permitted in contracting and
employment are remedial programs.
Nonetheless, to say that only remedial affirmative action
preferences are available in contracting and employment is
not to say that no affirmative action preferences are
permitted. Although Justices Scalia and Thomas oppose all
affirmative action preferences in these areas,"' no other
member of the Court has joined them in their extreme
position. Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality in
Croson, reiterated her position in Wygant that voluntary
affirmative action by state and local government was
permissible, and an important anti-discrimination tool, when
justified as a remediation of discrimination.' As she
explained in Croson,
Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity
from taking action to rectify the effects of identified
discrimination within its jurisdiction. If the city of
Richmond had evidence before it that nonminority
contractors were systematically excluding minority
businesses from subcontracting opportunities, it could
take action to end the discriminatory exclusion. Where
there is a significant statistical disparity between the
number of qualified minority contractors willing and able
to perform a particular service and the number of such
158. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
159. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
160. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
161. The Supreme Court has not addressed the status of outreach programs.
162. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240
(Thomas, J., concurring).
163. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 290 (1986).
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contractors actually engaged by the locality or the
locality's prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory
exclusion could arise .... Moreover, evidence of a pattern
of individual discriminatory acts can, if supported by
appropriate statistical proof, lend support to a local
government's determination that broader remedial relief
is justified. 164
Following the Croson decision, but prior to the passage of
Proposition 209, California's governmental entities could
engage in remedial affirmative action preferences in three
circumstances. First, a governmental entity could recognize,
or discover, that it had been discriminating and could
voluntarily establish an affirmative action preference
program to remedy its prior conduct. To do so, however,
required strong evidence of discrimination and a narrowly
tailored affirmative action plan, targeting the victims of the
prior discrimination. In governmental contracting, this was
the most common form of affirmative action preferences prior
to Proposition 209. Although it was only permitted when
there was substantial evidence of prior discrimination,
several cities had uncovered such evidence, and had thus
submitted to affirmative action preference programs.'
Second, a governmental entity, having been sued for
discrimination, could recognize its potential liability and
agree to a court-supervised settlement, called a "consent
decree," that included a remedial affirmative action
preference program. Where the evidence uncovered through
civil discovery suggested that the government entity was
likely to lose the suit, this was by far the preferable way to
settle, since it reduced costs while permitting the government
to help shape the remedy. Third, a governmental entity,
164. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
165. For example, San Francisco, following an extensive investigation
designed to meet the Croson standards, found that it had long excluded women
and minority owned firms from participating in city contracting, and
established a remedial affirmative action program. The Associated General
Contractors challenged the program in U.S. district court. When Chief Judge
Henderson denied the contractors' motion for a preliminary injunction, they
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which
affirmed the district court decision. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. San
Francisco, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992). The
denial of certiorari does not, of course, mean that the Supreme Court approved
of San Francisco's affirmative action program; it merely means the Court was
not interested in reviewing the program at that time.
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having been sued for discrimination, and deciding to fight the
case, could lose; the court could then impose a remedial
affirmative action preference program.'66
Because of the passage of Proposition 209, the first and
second forms of remedial affirmative action are no longer
permitted to public entities in California if they include race
or gender-based preferences. Only the third remains
available and possibly only in cases litigated in federal court.
Thus, when it is discovered that a governmental entity has
been discriminating against a class of persons based on their
race or sex, it cannot voluntarily remedy the problem with
constitutionally permitted preferences of the kind Professor
Carcieri professes to support,'67 nor can it settle a lawsuit
short of judgement. It must wait until it is sued and it has
lost and then subject itself to a court ordered remedy. For
opponents of remedial affirmative action, this is a good result,
since it prevents the adoption of some affirmative action
programs and delays others. But the suggestion that a
supporter of remedial affirmative action preferences should
oppose Proposition 209 is indefensible. Here again, if
Professor Carcieri really supports this form of affirmative
action, he should have applauded the ACLU's position.
C. Outreach and Aggressive Recruitment Programs
In expressing his support for outreach and aggressive
recruiting programs, Professor Carcieri treats them as
outside the purview of Proposition 209.168 But as he
recognizes, the initiative's leading proponent, former
Governor Pete Wilson, disagrees.66  Believing that all
outreach and recruiting programs that target women and
minorities violate Proposition 209, the Governor ordered all
such programs de-funded in the wake of its passage. It was,
in large part, to save these programs, that the ACLU filed its
lawsuit.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
167. Further litigation is likely to occur regarding this question. In Croson,
Justice Kennedy expressed the view that the state has an "absolute duty" to
voluntarily engage in remedial affirmative action when it uncovers its own prior
intentional discrimination. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
518 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168. Carcieri supra note 1, at 182-83.
169. Id. at 182-83 n.170 (concerning programs Governor Wilson has asked
the legislature to repeal).
1999] 1183
1184 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
A study published in 1998 described all thirty-one state-
funded programs that California Governor Wilson had slated
for elimination under Proposition 209."0° Ten of the eleven
education programs set for de-funding were outreach,
recruitment, or mentoring programs; only one, a student
transfer program giving preferences to minority students
transferring from community colleges to state universities,
was a preference program. 7' Two of the three employment
programs were outreach and recruiting programs; the third
required diversity in the membership of the Youthful
Offender Parole Board and the Board of Prison Terms.'72
Most of the remaining programs were contracting programs
in which state contractors were required to either reach
certain sub-contracting goals or provide evidence that they
had invited women and minority-owned businesses to bid on
their subcontracts.
173
One recent decision by the California Superior Court in
Sacramento held that outreach programs are unaffected by
Proposition 209 .1' But Ward Connerly, the former chair of
the campaign in support of the initiative, has announced his
intent to appeal.'75 In the absence of clear authority, many
governmental entities throughout the state are dismantling
their outreach programs.
17
Professor Carcieri points to the City of San Jose's
170. ACLU, REACHING FOR THE DREAM: PROFILES IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
1998 (visited April 8, 1999) <http://www.aclu-sc.org>. The study was published
by a consortium of civil rights organizations, including the ACLU, the Asian
Pacific American Legal Center, the California Women's Law Center, Chinese for
Affirmative Action, the Employment Law Center, Equal Rights Advocates, the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Fund, and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. I wrote
the introduction.
171. Id. at 7-17.
172. Id. at 17-19.
173. Id. at 21-27.
174. Pete Wilson v. State Personnel Bd., No. 96CS01082 (Superior Court,
Sacramento County), November 30, 1998 available at
<http://www.sna.com/courts/rulings/docs/wilsonr.pdf> (visited April 16, 1999);
see also Henry Weinstein, Judge Upholds Key Affirmative Action Laws, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al.
175. Bob Egelko, Civil Rights Groups Want Action from Davis, Lockyer,
ASSOCIATED PRESS POLITICAL SERVICE, Feb. 5, 1999.
176. See OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE STATE OF PUBLIC SECTOR AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION IN POST PROPOSITION 209 CALIFORNIA <http://www.equalrights.org>
(1998) (a joint project of Chinese for Affirmative Action and Equal Rights
Advocates).
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affirmative action program as the kind of program properly
eliminated under Proposition 209.'7 But the San Jose
program is precisely the kind of aggressive outreach and
recruitment program that he claims to support. A description
of the history of San Jose's affirmative action efforts
illustrates the problems with Professor Carcieri's support of
Proposition 209.
Prior to 1989, the City of San Jose had an extensive
affirmative action program for the letting of city contracts.""
In 1989, in the wake of Croson, the city voluntarily suspended
its program and undertook a "Croson study" to determine
whether it was discriminating. The study revealed
continuing discrimination in a number of areas, including the
use of sub-contractors. Accordingly, in compliance with
Croson, the city instituted a program in 1991 that established
"participation goals" for minority-owned and women-owned
subcontractors. In 1996, following the passage of Proposition
209, the city suspended this program and developed a new
non-discrimination program designed to comply with
Proposition 209. Under the new program, the city requires
each bidder on a public works contract to provide evidence
that it has not excluded minority-owned and women-owned
subcontractors. The contractor can meet the requirement in
either of two ways. One, it can demonstrate that it has
actually contracted with minority-owned and women-owned
subcontractors at a level high enough to dispel any statistical
evidence of discrimination. Or two, it can demonstrate that it
has made good faith outreach efforts to minority-owned and
women-owned subcontractors, by providing them with
written notice of an opportunity to bid.
The California Superior Court ruled that by using a
numerical reference to measure compliance with non-
discrimination policies, and by requiring outreach to
minority-owned and women-owned subcontractors, but not
white male-owned firms, the city has established a
preference, in violation of Proposition 209. The obvious
problem with this ruling is that in the absence of these
177. Carcieri, supra note 1, at 182 n.168.
178. The facts regarding the City's programs are taken from the briefs in
City of San Jose v. Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc, CV768694 (California Superior
Court, County of Santa Clara), H018407 (Court of Appeal of the State of
California, Sixth Appellate District) (on file with author).
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efforts, the city can expect to return to its prior practice of
favoring, by intent or inadvertence, white male-owned firms
over others. If it is not permitted to engage in these kinds of
anti-discrimination efforts, it will continue to engage in its
well-documented prior discrimination against women and
minorities. Yet Professor Carcieri points to the San Jose case
as an example of the kind of affirmative action program that
should be eliminated.
VII. CONCLUSION
As all civil libertarians must acknowledge, Professor
Carcieri certainly has the right to describe his attack on the
ACLU as "progressive," or, for that matter, to call it anything
he chooses. But liberty demands responsibility, and we must
question whether it contributes to an already high-volume
debate to treat fiction as fact and anecdote as evidence.
Responsible scholarship requires accountability. That, in
turn, requires us to support our assertions with citations to
authority. I hope the reader agrees I have demonstrated that
Professor Carcieri's attack on the ACLU must be rejected as
unsound. There were too many analytical errors and too
much reliance on anecdote and opinion. I have described this
essay as a "conservative" reply because I have tried to limit
my assertions to those for which there are confirmable data.
1186 [Vol. 39
